مقتطفات من الفصل 17 من كتاب: Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House

حصلت علي نسخة من الكتاب و سوف اعرض لمقتطفات من الفصل 17 حيث جاء ذكر ولي العهد السعودي و عبد الفتاح السيسي في سياق ما يجري في عقل ترامب بخصوص الشرق الأوسط. طبعا السطور التي جاءت في الكتاب لا تكفي و لكنها تشير للغرابة التي حدثت بها الأمور مثل أن و لي العهد السعودي هومن تقرب من كوشنر، و أن عقليات ترامب وولي العهد تشابهت في قناعاتها ببعض الامور.
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( يتبع)

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

There was something curiously aligned between the Trump family and MBS. Like the entire Saudi leadership, MBS had, practically speaking, no education outside of Saudi Arabia. In the past, this had worked to limit the Saudi options—nobody was equipped to confidently explore new intellectual possibilities

MBS and Trump were on pretty much equal footing. Knowing little made them oddly comfortable with each other. When MBS offered himself to Kushner as his guy in the Saudi kingdom, that was “like meeting someone nice at your first day of boarding school,” said Kushner’s friend


محمد بن سلمان=MBS

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

The new Trump thinking about the Middle East became the following: There are basically four players (or at least we can forget everybody else)— Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The first three can be united against the fourth. And Egypt and Saudi Arabia, given what they want with respect to Iran—and anything else that does not interfere with the United States’ interests—will pressure the Palestinians to make a deal

[حامد السحلي]

تفاجأت أن الكتاب متوفر للتحميل المباشر على عدة مواقع رغم أنه صدر للتو
عادة لا يسمح بتسريبه أو نشره قبل سنة عالأقل من صدوره
ابحث عن اسم الكتاب وستجد مواقع لتحميله في أول عشر نتائج

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

This represented a queasy-making mishmash of thought. Bannon’s isolationism; Flynn’s anti-Iranism ; and Kushner’s Kissingerism (not so much Kissingerism as, having no point of view himself, a dutiful attempt to follow the ninety-four-year-old’s advice

But the fundamental point was that the last three administrations had gotten the Middle East wrong. It was impossible to overstate how much contempt the Trump people felt for the business-as-usual thinking that had gotten it so wrong. Hence, the new operating principle was simple: do the opposite of what they (Obama, but the Bush neocons, too) would do. Their behavior, their conceits, their ideas—in some sense even their backgrounds, education, and class—were all suspect. And, what’s more, you don’t really have to know all that much yourself; you just do it differently than it was done before

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

[align=left]In practice, the new foreign policy, an effective Trump doctrine, was to reduce the board to three elements: powers we can work with, powers we cannot work with, and those without enough power whom we can functionally disregard or sacrifice. It was cold war stuff. And, indeed, in the larger Trump view, it was during the cold war that time and circumstance gave the United States its greatest global advantage. That was when America was great

Kushner was the driver of the Trump doctrine. His test cases were China, Mexico, Canada, and Saudi Arabia. He offered each country the opportunity to make his father-in-law happy[/align]

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

[align=left]But it was the Saudis, also often maligned during the campaign, who, with their intuitive understanding of family, ceremony, and ritual propriety, truly scored

The foreign policy establishment had a long and well-honed relationship with MBS’s rival, the crown prince, Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN). Key NSA and State Department figures were alarmed that Kushner’s discussions and fast-advancing relationship with MBS would send a dangerous message to MBN. And of course it did. The foreign policy people believed Kushner was being led by MBS, whose real views were entirely untested. The Kushner view was either, naïvely, that he wasn’t being led, or, with the confidence of a thirty-six-year-old assuming the new prerogatives of the man in charge, that he didn’t care: let’s embrace anybody who will embrace us
[/align]

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

[align=left]
The Kushner/MBS plan that emerged was straightforward in a way that foreign policy usually isn’t: If you give us what we want, we’ll give you what you want. On MBS’s assurance that he would deliver some seriously good news, he was invited to visit the White House in March. (The Saudis arrived with a big delegation, but they were received at the White House by only the president’s small circle—and the Saudis took particular note that Trump ordered Priebus to jump up and fetch him things during the meeting.) The two large men, the older Trump and much younger MBS—both charmers, flatterers, and country club jokers, each in their way—grandly hit it off


It was an aggressive bit of diplomacy. MBS was using this Trump embrace as part of his own power play in the kingdom. And the Trump White House, ever denying this was the case, let him. In return, MBS offered a basket of deals and announcements that would coincide with a scheduled presidential visit to Saudi Arabia—Trump’s first trip abroad [/align]

[Dr-A-K-Mazhar]

من المثير للتفكير ظهور نسخ مترجمة للعربية ( 120 صفحة) علي النت للتحميل.

و الترجمة سيئة و من المحتمل أن الذي ترجمها استعمل ترجمة جوجل و قام بالقص و اللصق.

https://openload.co/f/0yPSOXn1S2U/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D9%88_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8.pdf

[ahmed_allaithy]

الترجمة العربية آلية وليست ترجمة جيدة بأي مقياس. الغرض منها دعائي فقط.

[حامد السحلي]

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